My work on litigation and civil procedure asks how procedural rules shape the real ability of parties to use the legal system. Litigation is costly, strategic, and often asymmetric. Rules about evidence, funding, settlement, and early dismissal therefore affect not only courtroom outcomes, but also bargaining power, access to justice, and public participation.

In my work on third-party litigation funding, I examine both visible and concealed forms of litigation finance. Traditional funding can improve access to courts and strengthen the bargaining position of under-resourced litigants. But other forms of funding, including concealed support by interested repeat players, may distort litigation incentives in less transparent and more regressive ways. Related work reconceptualizes litigation funding as a quasi-partnership among claimants, funders, and attorneys.

I also write about SLAPP suits and procedural mechanisms for protecting public participation. These projects examine how procedural design can reduce the ability of powerful actors to use litigation costs as a tool for silencing criticism, while preserving legitimate defamation and privacy claims.

Representative topics include:

• Third-party litigation funding
• Concealed litigation finance
• Litigation funding as quasi-partnership
• Access to justice and settlement incentives
• SLAPP suits and public participation
• Evidence and procedural decision-making