A number of my articles contribute to a debate about robust moral realism, the view according to which there are objective moral facts. One type of challenge to this view is to argue that if there were moral facts, we would not have any way of knowing what they are. In particular, this is because our moral judgments were shaped by evolutionary forces that track adaptivity rather than abstract moral truths. In ‘Our Reliability Is In
Principle Explainable’ I suggest a way to respond to the challenge. In ‘A Reliability Challenge To Theistic Platonism’ and in ‘The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Different Than Theism’ I compare the prospects for responding to such challenges in metaethics to the prospects of solving similar challenges in philosophy of religion. Within this debate there is a principle called ‘Modal Security’ that has played a
significant role, due in particular to the work of Justin Clark-Doane (Columbia University). In joint work with Justin ('Modal Security'), we develop and discuss ten challenges to this principle.

1. ‘Modal Security’ (with Justin Clarke-Doane), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2021), pp. 162–183
2. ‘No Need to Get Up from the Armchair (If You Are Interested in Debunking Arguments in Metaethics)’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23:3–4 (2020), pp. 575–590
3. ‘The Explanatory Challenge: Moral Realism Is No Better Than Theism’, European Journal of Philosophy 26:1 (2018), pp. 368–389
4. ‘Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable’, Episteme 14:2 (2017), pp. 197–211