Phenomenal Conservatism vs Bayesianism: Three models of coexistence
This paper explores how phenomenal conservatism (PC) and Bayesianism can coexist within a complete theory of epistemic norms. Assuming their compatibility, I propose three models to map the relationship between their respective norms. The first model differentiates their roles, casting PC as an explanatory theory of epistemic justification and Bayesianism as an instrumental guide. The second introduces levels of explanation, positioning PC at the fundamental level of elementary justification from which Bayesian principles derive. The third analyzes their varying degrees of idealization, viewing Bayesianism as an ideal theory demanding logical omniscience, and PC as a non-ideal theory.
No Bayesian Threat to Phenomenal Conservatism
According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), we have mental states called ‘seemings’, that play a foundational role in justifying beliefs (Huemer 2007; McAllister 2023). John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2021) (H&L) have recently argued that PC should be rejected because it has implications that are contrary to Bayesian reasoning. According to their diagnosis, PC has a problematic feature, which they call content irrelevance that is the cause for all the trouble. In this paper I respond to their arguments. I first explain why I doubt that it is possible for any Bayesian argument to refute PC. I then address H&L’s argument head on. I argue that H&L’s examples do not show that content irrelevance is a problem, rather, the problem lies is four assumptions that H&L make in their derivation of probabilistic generalizations from PC.
Should university campuses be politically neutral? This question, sometimes treated as a single question with a single answer, is better thought of as encompassing a family of questions that need not have the same answer. In this paper I focus mainly on whether professors can or should express political views in class, and also a bit on whether higher education institutions should make public statements expressing political views. However, many of the considerations discussed can be applied mutatis mutandis to other questions as well. I distinguish between absolutist arguments, often thought by proponents to apply universally to all institutions and contexts, and more nuanced context dependent considerations. I argue that the absolutist arguments fail. While this means that things are complicated and messy, and there may not be a one size fit all ideal prescription, the paper will describe a plethora of considerations that should be taken into account when devising policies.
Refuting Arguments from Prophecy
Arguments from fulfilled prophecy are among the most influential sources of religious belief. Despite this, they have received remarkably little attention in contemporary philosophy of religion. This paper aims at filling the gap. I argue that prophetic arguments are not only logically distinct from miracle arguments but also epistemically distinct in ways that make them worth independent philosophical analysis. I offer a novel framework for understanding their structure, and I develop a set of targeted strategies for evaluating and refuting them.
Epistemic vs Practical Balancing of Reasons
* In light of some good recent work on this topic, I probably won’t try to publish this any longer.
Several authors have noted an apparent contrast between practical and epistemic reasons. As Selim Berker (2018) recently put it, epistemic reasons balance prohibitively whereas practical reasons balance permissively. Berker argues that this contrast lends support to the view that there are no practical reasons for belief. I argue that, contrary to these previous authors, either practical reasons also balance prohibitively, or epistemic reasons never balance prohibitively. Either way, these previous authors were wrong about the contrast and Berker’s argument fails. The discussion reveals new distinctions between types of reason, which, I argue, provide a better explanation for when and why reasons balance prohibitively vs. permissively.