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GENDER INEQUALITY IN MAJORITY AND MINORITY GROUPS IN ISRAEL

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Abstract: This article is an empirical test of Almqvist's (1987) hypothesis that gender inequality is greater among groups with greater resources because men in the dominant group appropriate the surplus, whereas men in the most disadvantaged groups are forced to be more egalitarian. Using census data and multivariate logistic analyses, we examine gender differences in labor force participation, occupational status and income in eight ethnic- generational class groups in Israel: Israeli- born Jews, first- and second- generation Western Jews, first- and second- generation Eastern Jews, Moslems, Christians, and Druse. Almqvist's hypothesis is not supported by our data. We argue that gender inequalities are better explained by the structural advantage of men from the dominant group who control the allocation of resources for all groups. This advantage is augmented by economic development and differential opportunities for the accumulation of wealth. It is tempered by the protection provided by ethnic labor market enclaves.

Keywords: gender inequality, Israeli- born Jews, first- and second- generation Western Jews, first- and second- generation Eastern Jews, Moslems, Christians, and Druse

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Almquist's study (1987) of gender inequality in and among racial ethnic groups in the United States was one of the early attempts at an empirical examination premised on a nonadditive model of the effects of race, class, and gender (see footnote 16 in King, 1988). Almquist hypothesized "that minority groups with greater material resources exhibit higher levels of occupational gender inequality than groups with fewer resources." Groups with greater resources have greater gender inequality in education, job status, and income because the men in the groups appropriate the surplus resources to enhance their status. Consequently these men "can command more support, personal care taking and services from their wives than men in the less advantaged groups...and have the potential to exert more authority in household affairs." Conversely, men in the most disadvantaged groups are forced to be more egalitarian "at least in the distribution of scarce resources necessary for survival."

Focusing on within-group processes, Almquist (1987) observed that "this thesis contradicts the contention of many scholars that the most disadvantaged minority men will be the most dominating of women in their personal lives." As an example of the argument that disadvantage increases gender inequality Almquist (1995) referred to Garcia-Bahne's (1977) study which showed that in Mexico, Anglo exploitation and domination created conditions favoring male dominance. In response to the tough, competitive, authoritarian situation on the job and his declining status in the family, the Mexican American male worker demanded extra obedience and deference from his wife.

Studies by Gwartney (1997) and Dunn (1993), the only studies found that tested Almquist's hypothesis, produced contradictory findings. Like Almquist, Gwartney (1997), who examined occupational gender inequality among Aborigines and 12 groups of first-generation immigrants in Australia, found less gender inequality in the poorest and most recent immigrant minority groups than in the more advantaged groups. She attributed this finding of the different levels of within-group gender inequalities to the preference of white, male employers for hiring men from some groups for jobs with higher pay and better opportunities for advancement.

In contrast, Dunn (1993), focusing on scheduled castes and tribes in India, found less gender inequality in education and employment among the groups who are more developed (according to standard indicators) than among those who were less developed. The women in the more educated minority groups were better able to exchange their higher educational credentials for greater access to employment relative to men, a finding that "does not support the view that more developed scheduled groups withdraw women from the labor force in an attempt to emulate higher status groups." Dunn suggested that the effect may be due to the

introduction of developmental programs that target aid and assistance directly to women, thus empowering women to take advantage of their groups' surplus resources to enhance their otherwise disadvantaged position.

The studies by Gwartney (1997) and Dunn (1993) produced contradictory findings. Both authors, however, explain their outcomes with reference to the same causal factors—namely opportunities in the labor market in Australia produced by white male employers or in India as a result of developmental programs geared toward women. Neither attributed the relative level of within-group inequality to gender processes internal to the group, as Almquist suggested.

The hypothesis that gender inequality increases with the level of a group's advantage is based on the assumption that in any group, men have greater power than women and control the flow of resources in the group. The first assumption is widely supported. However, the second is more problematic because it underrates the interaction effects of class, ethnicity, and gender and does not take into account such structural effects as occupational segregation and internal and ethnic-enclave labor markets that influence women's opportunities in the marketplace.

The study of gender inequality in both the majority and minority groups of Israeli society presented here reexamine and extended Almquist's original study. It explores the validity of alternative hypotheses regarding the effects of a group's increased resources on gender inequality, as well as the correlates of gender inequality within groups. It is also the first to examine gender inequality and its correlates in both Jewish and non-Jewish (Arab-Palestinian) minority groups in Israel.

Most studies of social inequality in Israel to date have dealt with inequality among ethnic groups and have been based on all-male samples (see, for example, Amir, 1988; Haberfeld and Cohen, 1998; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993). Several studies have specifically investigated within-gender ethnic differences in the labor force participation, income, and occupational status of Jews (Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998; Kraus, 1989). Research since the late 1970s has documented gender inequalities for the population as a whole in many areas of economic life, including income (Efroni, 1989; Haberfeld, 1993; Haberfeld and Cohen, 1996; Izraeli and Gaier, 1979; Lewin-Epstein and Stier, 1987; Semyonov and Kraus, 1983), labor market opportunities (Azmon and Izraeli, 1993; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993), and opportunities for advancement to senior positions (Haberfeld, 1992; Izraeli, 1994). Studies of gender inequality, however, have tended to ignore or, at best, make only passing reference to gender-based ethnic differences. In addition, such studies have rarely included non-Jewish women (for an exception, see Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993). We begin with a description of the eight groups examined in the study and then review the pertinent

literature on ethnicity and gender inequality in Israel.

SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND MINORITY GROUPS IN ISRAEL

The population of Israel is segmented into a number of socially significant groups (see Table 1). The deepest cleavage is national—between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs, who have been referred to in recent years as Israeli Palestinians to signal their national identification with Palestinians living on the West Bank. This cleavage overlaps with that of religion—between Jews, on the one hand, and Moslems, Christians, and Druse on the other.

The major cleavage among Jews is based on country of origin: those from the more traditional, economically less-developed Moslem countries of North Africa and the Middle East, referred to as Easterners, and those from the more modern, industrialized Christian countries of Europe and North and South America, referred to as Westerners. Although only the non-Jewish groups are referred to colloquially as “minorities.” Easterners, although similar in number to Westerners, constitute a minority group in that they have less access to the valued resources of Israeli society and their distinctive cultural traditions are denigrated by the hegemonic European culture. Westerners, Easterners, and non-Jews are organized into a system of ethnic stratification and “a tripartite ethnic order, with European-American Jews on top, Asian-African Jews in the middle and Arabs on the bottom” (Semyonov and Tyree, 1981).

The formation of a Jewish ethnic class system and the subordination of Jews of Eastern origin is commonly explained in terms of accumulated disadvantages. These disadvantages resulted from the Easterners’ late arrival in the state; traditional occupational skills unsuited for a modern economy; and lack of experience living in a democratic, industrial society (Ben-Rafael, 1982; Smootha and Peres, 1973); as well as from their lack of appropriate motivation to change (Eisenstadt, 1964). Smootha (1978), however, argued that the absorbing group’s attitudes of superiority and paternalism, together with the perceptions of Easterners as backward and their “Levantine” culture as threatening to European cultural hegemony in the new society, impeded the process of absorption. Although the earnings gap between Eastern-born and Western-born Jews diminished significantly during the 1970s, the earnings gaps between Easterners and Westerners who were born in Israel increased (Amir, 1988; Cohen and Haberfeld, 1998). This development is statistically correlated with the deepening educational gap among Israeli-born Easterners and Westerners (Mark, 1996) and ethnic differences in the opportunity structure of the labor market.

From being a majority during the British mandate, Arabs became a minority in the state of Israel, totally dependent on the Jewish-dominated economy. The 1948 war between the newly declared state of Israel and its Arab neighbors

Table 1 Total Population of Israel, by Ethnic-Generational Group and Gender

	Father born in Israel		Jews Born in Israel		Jews Born in		Non-Jews			Total
	Father born in Israel	EA*	Father born in Israel	AA*	EA*	AA*	Moslems	Christians	Druze	
Percent of Group in the population	13.4	13.6	21.9	18.9	15.2	13.1	2.3	1.6	100	
Men (thousands)	284.3	287.4	474.2	369.2	307.7	273.3	46.6	34.3	2077	
Women (thousands)	269.2	276.2	430.2	414.4	319.1	266.4	48.5	32.3	2056.3	

*EA = Europe or America; AA = Asia or Africa.

Source: The Israeli Census (1983).

destroyed the social, political, and economic infrastructure of Arab society. Arab society was bereft of large sections of its upper classes—landowners, merchants, religious leaders, and professionals—who fled or were forced to leave the country. The remaining majority, who lived in small underdeveloped rural villages, was largely illiterate and had no accepted leadership. The lack of a peace agreement with neighboring Arab countries at the end of the 1948 war; the state of belligerence between Israel and its Arab neighbors that has continued ever since, erupting from time to time into full-scale war; and discriminatory policies in the allocation of resources have resulted in considerable hardships for the Arab population of Israel.

The major cleavage in the Arab community is along religious lines—between Moslems and Christians. Although the Druse are an Islamic sect, they did not define themselves as Arabs until recently. During 50 years of struggle between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the Druse have identified politically with the Jewish state. Druse men are subject to compulsory military service whereas Moslem men are not. Compared to Moslems and Druse, Christians are more urbanized, more educated, and have a lower birth rate. As Semyonov and Lewin-Epstein (1987) noted, the non-Jewish minority group is lower on all standard indicators of socioeconomic status than the Jewish population, and both occupational and residential segregation between Jews and Arabs are extreme.

Ethnic differences are especially significant for the status of women. Women's inferiority to men, subjection to men's control, and restriction to the home and family were more characteristic of the Moslem culture in the countries from which Eastern Jews came and of rural Arab society before the state of Israel was declared than of Western communities. Unlike the immigrant Eastern men, who were literate in Hebrew from childhood, a significant proportion of immigrant Eastern women were illiterate in any language. In 1961, the labor force participation rate of women born in Asia and Africa was less than half that of women born in Europe and America (14 and 31 percent respectively) and similar to that of women in their countries of origin (Hartman, 1980). The differences in labor force participation could not be explained by differences in educational achievement, since similar differences were found for uneducated and highly educated women.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the ethnic gap in labor force participation had decreased considerably and fertility rates for Eastern and Western women became increasingly similar. The birth rate declined significantly among Easterners and increased somewhat among Westerners (Ben-Porath and Gronau, 1985). The gap in education, however, persists and results in different occupational distributions for Easterners and Westerners of both generations.

Arab women face "multiple jeopardy" (King, 1988)—not only the simultaneous oppressions stemming from their being Arab and female, but the

multiplicative relationships among these disadvantaged identities. According to Mar'i and Mar'i (1985), Israel's victory over its Arab neighbors in the 1967 war created conditions that led to Israeli Arab men's greater control of Israeli Arab women. Arab men were resistant to change because they equated the modernization of women with becoming "like the Jews." They also considered education and paid employment for women a threat to the Arab national identity (*The Status of Palestinian Women*, 1997). These attitudes began to change as increased interaction with Arabs in other countries after 1967 exposed Israeli Arabs to the modernization of women as a universal phenomenon (Mar'i and Mar'i, 1985). New employment opportunities for Arab women, created by the demand for teachers and social workers in the Arab sector, as well as for blue-collar workers in the light industries opened by Jewish manufacturers in the villages, provided women with an independent source of income. Christian women are overrepresented among semiprofessionals and Moslem women are overrepresented among underpaid factory workers. Labor force participation, however, was (and still is) further hindered by the lack of child-care facilities and limited employment opportunities.

In addition, although the gender-education gap among Arabs is closing, Arab women remain the most undereducated group in Israel. Paradoxically, whereas Druse men have more contact with Jews than do Moslem or Christian men, Druse women remain more isolated and less educated than either Moslem or Christian women. There are a number of explanations for this difference. First, the Druse community generally exerts strong control over its members. Second, a large proportion of Druse men are employed by the military, police force, and other security agencies and have relatively higher and more stable incomes, which reduce the need for Druse women to find jobs. Third, as soldiers Druse men have more firsthand experience with what they consider culturally unacceptable "permissive behaviors" of Jewish women in the military and elsewhere.

Like scholars of race and gender elsewhere (Spellman, 1988), researchers in Israel have tended to focus on ethnicity in isolation from other aspects of identity, such as class and gender. When they have studied gender, they have usually done so in isolation from class and ethnicity (for an exception, see Bernstein, 1983). The blindness to ethnicity in the studies of gender began to dissipate during the 1990s, particularly after 1995 when new voices are heard. For example, the work of Dahan-Kalev (1997), who analyzed the oppression of Jewish Eastern women experience at the hands of Jewish Western women, represents an emerging Easterner-feminist consciousness. In addition, the Report on the Status of Palestinian Women citizens of Israel (1997), submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is the first major work to document the interlinked impact of gender, ethnicity, and class for Palestinian women.

METHODOLOGY

Data for the present investigation of gender-based inequality were obtained from the 20 percent sample of the 1983 Israeli census. The population of the study was the civilian labor force aged 25-65 unless specified otherwise.

The eight ethnic-generational groups studied were: Jews born in Europe and America, their Israeli-born offspring, Jews born in Africa and Asia, their Israeli-born offspring, second-generation Jews born in Israel, Moslems, Christians, and Druse. The Central Bureau of Statistics bases the designation of Jews born in Israel on the fathers' countries of origin. The focus of analysis in this study is on gender differences in each of the eight subpopulations.

Gender inequality in labor force participation, share in high-status occupations, and share in earnings were the key dependent variables. On the basis of studies on modernization, development, and status attainment, which have claimed an association between women's entry into the labor force and their political and social status, we included women's share of the labor market as a measure of within-group gender inequality. The second dependent variable is women's share in high-status occupations, including professional and scientific occupations, managerial and administrative occupations, and semiprofessional and technical occupations (for a detailed list of occupations in each category, see Appendix 1). Even though the semiprofessional and technical occupations have less status, authority, and control, they were included with the other two categories because of the small number of Moslems and Druse in the professional and scientific occupations and of Moslem, Druse, and Christians in managerial and administrative occupations.

The gender distribution in each occupational category was analyzed using two methods. First, following Almqvist, we adjusted the within-occupation gender distribution to the gender distribution in the total labor force, thus providing a measure of "women's adjusted share" of the occupation (for the calculation of women's adjusted share, see Table 3, note d). Second, using a regression framework we estimated two logistic models for each of the eight groups—three combinations of occupations. The first model predicted the log odds of men who belong to a specific group being in one of the three occupations. The second model estimated the same log odds after controlling for gender differences in education, age, and hours of work. We assumed that a person's education and hours of work are exogenous to her or his entry into an occupation.

Finally, we examined the women-to-men earnings ratios in each group and derived the estimated gender-based salary discrimination for each group by controlling for individual-level human capital characteristics. Here, again, we used two methods. In the first method, we estimated two ordinary least squares (OLS)

regression models. In model 1, earnings served as the dependent variable and gender served as the explanatory variable. In model 2, we added education, age, occupational status, and hours of work to the equation. We assumed that the coefficients of these explanatory variables are the same for men and for women. These two models were estimated separately for each one of the eight groups. The gender coefficients served as the estimated inequality between men and women in each group, representing the advantage of men in earnings compared with the earnings of women of equal characteristics. In the second method, we estimated two separate equations—one for each gender group—in each of the eight groups. In contrast to the first method, the second allows the coefficients of the regression equations (the slopes of the regression lines) to vary across gender groups).

Following Almquist (1987), we examined other variables, including within-group sex ratio, percentage of women married, average number of children, average gender gap in education, labor force participation rate, employment sector (private, public or self-employed), and percentage of family households headed by women. In the analysis that follows, we compare the characteristics of the eight ethnic-generational groups and then the within-group level of gender inequality across the eight groups for the dependent variables representing share of the labor force, occupational achievement, and income.

GENDER INEQUALITY IN ETHNIC GROUPS

Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive data for the eight groups examined in this study. As Table 2 indicates women's labor force participation and representation in professional and scientific and managerial and administrative occupations are generally higher in the dominant groups. Specifically, the participation of married women in the civilian labor force is the highest among Israeli-born Jewish women with fathers who were born in Europe or America or in Israel. These two groups are followed by Israeli-born Jewish women with fathers born in Asia or Africa and Jewish women born in Europe or America and then by Jewish women born in Asia or Africa and by Christian women. Participation is the lowest among Moslem and Druse women.

Whereas generation is more important than ethnic origin for labor force participation among Jewish women, for participation in the two high-status occupational groups, ethnic origin is more important than generation. We found the highest proportion of first- and second-generation Jewish women with fathers born in Europe or America in the professional and managerial and administrative occupations and the lowest or no proportion of Moslem and Druse women in this category. With regard to women in the scientific professions, the proportion of Christian women is similar to that of Israeli-born women whose fathers were born in Asia or Africa.

With regard to both labor force and occupational share (the top two panels of Table 3), the rank order of gender inequality within groups parallels that of women's labor force participation (see Table 2). When women's *adjusted* share in managerial and professional occupations (the lower panel of Table 3) is considered, however, no consistent pattern emerges. With "0" indicating equality, negative ratios indicating inequality favoring men, and positive ratios indicating inequality favoring women, we observed that gender inequality for the scientific professions, as measured by women's adjusted share, is greater among Christian women, followed by women born in Asia or Africa and the greatest for managerial and administrative jobs for first- and second-generation Jewish women of European or American origin.

Women constitute the majority of semiprofessional and technical workers in all except the lowest-ranking group. Their adjusted share is positive for all groups and the highest among Christians.

Logistic analyses were used to estimate the net effect of gender on occupational distribution, controlling for age, education, and hours of work. The results of the logit analyses presented in Table 4 do not reveal any theoretically relevant pattern. Looking at the simple model (the upper panel), one sees that gender inequality is the least (the men's coefficient is smaller) in the groups of Moslems, Israelis born to fathers from Asia or Africa, and second-generation Israelis and greater in the groups of Druse, Christians, and Israelis born to fathers from Europe or America.

When multivariate logit models are estimated (the lower panel of Table 4) and men's likelihood of being included in high-status occupations is adjusted for differences in age, education, and hours of work, the pattern remains the same for managerial and administrative occupations. In the case of professional and scientific occupations, however, men's adjusted share rises (greater inequality) for Moslems and Israelis born to fathers from Asia or Africa and declines for Druse.

With regard to inequality in earnings (Table 5, upper panel), the pattern is also not as predicted. The least inequality (highest women-to-men earnings ratios) is found among Moslems and Christians, followed by Israeli-born Jews whose fathers were born in Asia or Africa. The greatest inequality (hourly earnings) is found among Israeli-born Jews whose fathers were born in Europe or America, followed closely by Jews born in Asia or Africa, Jews born in Europe or America, and second-generation Israelis.

When a simple OLS regression model is estimated (the upper-middle panel of Table 5), in which the coefficient of the simple model indicates men's premium in hourly earnings (expressed in percentage points) compared to women's monthly earnings, the pattern is similar except among the dominant group—Israeli-born

Table 2 Characteristics of Ethnic/Generational Groups in Israel

	Father born in Israel		Jews Born in Israel		Jews Born in EA*		Non-Jews	
	Father born in Israel	Father born in EA*	Father born in AA*	EA*	AA*	Moslems	Christians	Druse ^b
Sex ratio, Aged 25+	100	98	96	86	95	96	89	98
Percentage Women Married, Aged 16+	53.1	69.2	53.9	78.5	80.6	65.1	60.1	68.2
Cumulative Fertility ^c	2766	2491	2825	2428	3721	6728	3282	6276
Men's Advantage in College Education	0.18 0.02	0.19 0.11	0.21 -0.07	0.19 0.31	0.53 0.55	0.52 0.46	0.83 0.79	0.97 0.91
Percentage in Labor Force								
Women, Aged 16+	50.9	65.9	49.4	55.3	41.4	11.4	32.1	12.8
Married Women, Aged 16+	62.6	70.6	54.1	55.7	39.9	9.1	26.7	7.7
Men, Aged 16+	62.7	77.4	58.7	86.3	83.6	71.4	75.1	57.7
Class of Worker (Percent)								
Private-Sector Salaried Workers*	47.3	45.3	59.6	48.5	52.4	66.2	55.6	57.7
Public-Sector Salaried Workers	36.9	40.3	30.1	37.0	32.8	21.5	29.7	31.7
Self-employed, Unpaid Family Members	13.2	12.4	9.5	13.3	14.2	12.3	14.3	10.3
Labor Force Participation Rate								
Men	88.7	91.4	85.4	89.5	85.9	83.2	85.0	71.1
Women	64.0	74.6	58.8	55.3	40.5	11.1	32.2	7.6
Occupational Distribution ^d								
Percentage Salaried Men in Professional/Scientific Occupations	7.1	11.5	2.6	10.3	2.3	2.1	5.2	1.7
Percentage Salaried Women in Professional/Scientific Occupations	6.7	10.2	2.6	9.2	1.8	1.9	3.1	0.0
Percentage Salaried Men in Semiprofessional Occupations	7.3	10.5	6.2	8.0	5.2	6.3	7.1	8.7
Percentage Salaried Women in Semiprofessional Occupations	19.0	26.0	17.4	18.7	12.2	26.1	29.0	15.6
Percent Salaried Men in Managerial and Administrative Occupations	7.3	9.3	3.1	7.0	4.1	0.0	1.1	0.1
Percentage Salaried Women in Managerial and Administrative Occupations	2.9	2.5	1.4	2.0	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percentage Family Households Headed by Women	15.3	13.4	11.8	17.4	13.6	9.4	14.7	6.7

* AA=Asia or Africa, EA= Europe or America
^b These figures represent participation rates in the civilian labor force. Since a high proportion of Druse men work in the non civilian labor force (e.g. army, police), we observe a relatively low participation rate among Druse men
^c Number of men per 100 women
^d Salaried workers include those paid hourly. Approximately 90 percent of employed persons in Israel are salaried workers
^e Expressed as the percentage of the total group labor force.
^f First row presents figures for people aged 25-50, second row for people aged 20+.
^g [(Percentage of men college graduates minus percentage of women college graduates) / Percentage of recent men college graduates]
^h Number of children per 1,000 women aged 35-44. Data available for non single women only.
 Source: The Israeli Census (1983).

Table 3 Women's Share of the Israeli Labor Force and of the Three Occupational Categories, 1983

	Jews Born in Israel		Jews Born in:		Non-Jews			
	Father born in Israel	Father born in EA ^a	Father born in AA ^a	EA ^a	AA ^a	Moslems	Christians	Druse ^b
Women's Share of the Labor Force ^c	42.7	45.5	41.3	41.6	33.0	11.7	30.2	9.4
Salaried Women's Share: ^c								
Professional/Scientific	40.0	41.4	39.7	37.2	26.8	13.5	21.9	8.8
Semi-Professional Managerial and Administrative	65.8	66.9	64.3	61.8	52.9	35.5	62.1	15.4
	22.3	17.1	21.3	16.2	12.7	3.8	9.4	^e
Salaried Women's Adjusted Share: ^d								
Professional/Scientific	-2.7	-4.1	-2.2	-4.4	-6.2	-1.8	-8.3	-0.6
Semi-Professional Managerial and Administrative	23.1	21.4	23.0	20.2	19.9	23.8	31.9	6.0
	-20.4	-28.4	-20.0	-25.4	-20.3	-7.9	-20.8	^e

^a AA=Asia or Africa; EA=Europe or America

^b These figures represent participation rates in the civilian labor force. Since a high proportion of Druse men work in the non civilian labor force (e.g., army, police), we observe a relatively low participation rate among Druse men.

^c (Number of women employed)/[(Number of women employed + Number of men employed)].

^d [(Number of women employed in the occupational category) / (Number of women employed in the occupational category + Number of men employed in the occupational category)] - (Women's share of the labor force).

^e There were no Druse female managers in 1983 census.

Source: The Israeli census (1983).

Table 4 Men's Share of the Three Occupational Categories, 1983: Results of the Logistic Regression Analyses

Source:	Jews Born in Israel			Jews Born in:		Non-Jews			
	Father born in Israel	Father born in EA ^a	Father born in AA ^a	EA ^a	AA ^a	Moslems	Christians	Druse	
The Israeli census (1983)									
	Men's coefficient in a simple logistic model:								
	Professional/Scientific	0.24	0.29	0.18	0.19	0.34	0.0	0.48	0.63
Semi-Professional	-1.01	-1.07	-1.03	-0.98	-0.90	-2.04	-1.71	-1.15	
Managerial and Administrative	1.15	1.58	0.95	1.40	1.39	0.78	1.60	6.00 ^c	
Men's coefficient in a multivariate logistic model ^b :									
	Professional/Scientific	0.52	0.36	0.71	0.31	0.57	0.54	0.87	0.44
	Semi-Professional	-0.63	-0.56	-0.53	-0.60	-0.61	-1.90	1.51	-1.29
Managerial and Administrative	0.64	0.98	0.57	1.01	0.93	0.51	1.70	5.22 ^c	

^a EA=Europe or America; AA=Asia or Africa.

^b Controlling for education, age, and hours of work.

^c There were no Druse female managers in the 1983 census.

Table 5 Salaried Women-to-Men Earnings Ratios by Group, 1983

	Jews Born in Israel		Jews Born in:		Non-Jews			
	Father born in Israel	Father born in EA ^a	Father born in AA ^a	EA ^a	AA ^a	Moslems	Christians	Druse
Women-to-Men Ratio; Hourly Earnings	0.81	0.80	0.88	0.75	0.74	1.09	0.94	0.81
Monthly Earnings	0.56	0.52	0.66	0.55	0.54	0.80	0.75	0.58
Men's Coefficient in a Simple OLS Model	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.29	0.31	-0.03	0.09	0.35
Men's Coefficient in a Multivariate OLS Model ^b	0.38	0.40	0.39	0.42	0.43	0.33	0.33	0.50
Adjusted Earnings Ratio ^c	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.52	0.50	0.63	0.64	0.42

^a EA Europe or America, AA= Asia or Africa

^b The determinants of (ln) earnings included hours of work, age, years of schooling, and status of occupation.

^c The adjusted ratio is the monthly earnings ratio after different attributes between men and women within each group are controlled. These ratios are obtained by decomposing the gap between the average monthly earnings of men and women into "explained" and "unexplained" portions. The determinants of earnings included hours of work, age, years of schooling, and socioeconomic status of occupation (see the Methodology section). The smaller the adjusted ratio, the larger the inequality.

Source: The Israeli census (1983)

Jews of fathers born in Europe or America—where the level of inequality is in the middle range between the two extremes.

The estimated men's coefficients in the multivariate models (the bottom-middle panel of Table 5), and the adjusted women-to-men earnings ratios (the bottom panel) show similar results. When gender differences in hours of work, age, years of schooling, and status of occupation in each group are controlled, both the rank order of the groups according to the men's coefficient and the residual of the adjusted proportion are similar to those for earnings with one exception: Gender inequality is the greatest among the Druse and consistently smallest among Moslems and Christians.

DISCUSSION

Almquist (1987) hypothesized that the level of gender inequality in a group is a function of the level of the group's resources. Our findings with regard to women's relative share of managerial and professional occupations and to women's adjusted earnings (not examined by Almquist) do not reveal a theoretically significant pattern and, consequently, on the whole do not support Almquist's hypothesis.

One consistent finding is that gender inequality in managerial and administrative occupations and earnings is the smallest among Moslems. Inequality in professional jobs is somewhere in midrange. A possible explanation for this finding is that the high level of segregation of labor markets between Jews and Arabs operates in favor of Arab women. When labor markets are ethnically segregated, as is the case for a large proportion of Arabs in Israel, each group supplies its own professionals and semiprofessionals. For example, schools in Moslem areas teach in Arabic and usually employ Moslem teachers. The situation is similar for schools in Christian and Druse sectors. The health and welfare services in the segregated Arab enclave are provided by Arabic-speaking professionals and semiprofessionals. Previous research (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993) found less gender inequality in occupational status and earnings based on discrimination, among Arabs employed in the segregated Arab enclave than among those employed in mixed ethnic communities

The gender segregation of occupations in the Arabic enclave parallels that of the Jewish economy. The within-gender competition for professional and semiprofessional jobs in which the majority of women are employed is less intense in the disadvantaged groups, where the proportion of available persons to fill these jobs is relatively small. In other words, we suggest that the level of gender inequality in the Moslem group is shaped more by the structure of the relations between Arabs and Jews than by within-group factors.

Almquist's contention that within-group processes determine the level of gender inequality in groups assumes that for any group, the men in the group control the distribution of resources in it. Class enters the picture in that the greater the resources of the group the more surplus available for men in the group to appropriate for their own advantage. This analysis, however, ignores the relationships among groups, particularly the interactions among gender, class and ethnicity. Connell's (1995) concept of "multiple masculinities" is instructive in this regard. Referring to the "gendered character of capital" Connell noted:

"[A] capitalist economy working through a gender division of labour is necessarily, a gendered accumulation process. It is not a statistical accident, but a part of the social construction of masculinity that men and not women control the major corporations and the great private fortunes."

Gender, however, intersects with race and class. The major corporations and great private fortunes are owned not by all men, but primarily by upper-class white men. We need to think in terms of multiple masculinities in which hegemonic masculinity relates to cultural dominance in the society as a whole and corresponds to institutional power. White men's masculinities are constructed in relation not only to white women but in relation to men of color. "Rather than a politics of women versus men," Lorber (1999:2) stated, "feminism must deal with complex systems of dominance and subordination, in which some men are subordinate to other men, and to some women as well."

Opportunities in the labor market for minority men and women, as well as for majority women, are controlled in large measure by men of the dominant group, either as employers or policy makers. Thus, Gwartney (1997), who found less inequality among the socially weakest Aborigines and immigrant groups, explained the male advantage in certain groups in terms of the preferences of white male employers. Dunn (1993) similarly explained the advantage of women in the socially stronger groups in terms of social policies directed to strengthening the position of these women in the labor market. Evidence from other studies has supported the argument that it is men from the dominant group, not those from the same group, who have the greatest impact on the gender gap in any group. For example, studying the effects of economic restructuring in Puerto Rico, Zsembik and Peek (1995) found that industrialization led to the displacement of men from the labor force and greater job opportunities for women, which, in turn, led to a narrowing of the gender earnings gap. Men in the dominant group are in a better position than men in other groups both to discriminate against women in their own group and to enhance their advantage vis-a-vis all other groups. Both men and women in the disadvantaged groups are discriminated against on the basis of minority-group membership.

Walby's (1997) distinction between domestic and more public gender

regimes is helpful for understanding the roles that different men play in controlling women's opportunities in these two domains:

The domestic gender regime is based upon household production as the main structure and site of women's work and activity and the exploitation of her labour and sexuality and upon the exclusion of women from the public. The public gender regime is based, not on excluding women from the public, but on the segregation and subordination of women in the structures of paid employment and the state.

The men in the group may have a considerable measure of control over the women in the group in the domestic gender regime. The measure of equality in groups should thus be measured in terms of the domestic division of labor and degree of exploitation of women's reproductive labor. It is usually not the men in the group who determine the women's opportunities in the public domain. Employers, not fathers or husbands, generally decide whether women will get jobs, how much they will earn, and whether they will be promoted to managerial positions. When women have opportunities for profitable employment, it becomes more worthwhile for fathers to invest in their daughters' education and for wives to negotiate with their husbands over participating in the labor force.

Recent studies have suggested that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Israeli-born Jewish men of European or American origin increased their earnings and occupational advantage over all the other groups in the Israeli labor market (Haberfeld and Cohen 1996, 1998). The pattern is similar to that identified for the United States (Gottschalk, 1997), where the increase in earnings among white men grew disproportionately to that of other racial-class-gender groups in the same period. Gottschalk (1997) cited two main reasons for this development: growth in returns on academic education and years of experience and the decline in the wages of workers without higher education. The growing socioeconomic gap between the majority group (native-born Western men) and all the others and the narrowing income gap between Western women and the other ethnic and gender categories in Israel is the outcome of processes associated with the interconnection between the ethnic-class structure and economic development. Employers in a growing economy are constantly seeking skilled professionals, so that Westerners (women and men) who acquire higher levels of education than do Arabs and Eastern Jews have an enormous advantage over the other groups in the labor market. In the high-tech sector, the fastest-growing and most lucrative sector, Israeli-born Western men are overrepresented in the professional and managerial occupations. Furthermore, the demand for their skills increases the returns on their education and training, which, in turn, contribute to the widening gap between Westerners and non-Westerners, most markedly Western men and the others. In addition, Western men—historically the economic elite in Israel—are advantageously placed for getting the best jobs and having the greatest economic opportunities in the growing local

and international markets. The narrowing educational gap between men and women in the non-Western groups has contributed to increasing equality in these groups.

The intergenerational transfer of wealth is another process that helps Westerners, both men and women, to perpetuate their socioeconomic advantage. Most wealth in Israel has been accumulated by Jews of Western origin. The process of transferring wealth from parents to children keeps the Israeli-born Westerners at the upper end of the income distribution (Semyonov, Lewin-Epstein, and Spilerman, 1996). Having higher levels of income, assets, and properties enables Westerners to accumulate even more wealth through investments in human and other forms of capital.

In conclusion, our findings suggest that the future study of gender inequality in the labor market requires more complex models of both gender and class. The level of gender inequality in a group or class needs to be studied in the context of the relationships between the classes or groups, as well as the intersections between multiple masculinities and femininities, multiple classes and multiple ethnic groups, and the effects of such factors as globalization, technological development, politics, and differential opportunities for the accumulation of wealth on these relationships.

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